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NONE OF THEIR BUSINESS: THE NEED FOR 
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE TO NEW YORK’S 
BAIL BOND BUSINESS 
Andrea Clisura 
INTRODUCTION 
On a Friday afternoon at approximately 5:00 p.m., the phone 
rings in the office of Vanguard Bail Bonds (“Vanguard”).1 A 
woman is calling to bail someone out of jail2—a friend, a family 
member, someone she cares for enough to help. The judge has set 
bail at $2,000.3 John Medina, a New York bail bondsman, quickly 
sums up what he needs from the caller.4 The fee will be $200, in 
accordance with New York statutory law limiting the fee to ten 
percent of the bond.5 But the caller will need $800 upfront, $600 of 
which will be deposited into an escrow account.6 This $600 is the 
collateral requirement imposed by Mr. Medina and the large 
national insurance company backing Vanguard.7 An agent contract 
                                                          
  J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2011; B.A. New York University, 
2005. Thank you to my parents, the members of the Journal of Law and Policy, 
and all those who shared a bit of their time and experience. 
1 Interview with John Medina, Bail Bondsman, Vanguard Bail Bonds 
Agency, Inc., in Queens, N.Y. (Oct. 2, 2009) (observed during personal 
interview). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 See N.Y. INS. LAW § 6804(a) (McKinney 2009). A ten percent charge is 
the limit for bonds or deposits not in excess of $3,000. Where bonds or deposits 
exceed $3,000, the licensee may charge an additional eight percent of the excess 
up to $10,000 and six percent of any amount exceeding $10,000. Id. 
6 Interview with John Medina, supra note 1.  
7 Id.; see also People v. James, N.Y. L.J., June 3, 1999, at 31, col. 2 (Sup. 
Ct. Bronx County June 3, 1999) (describing procedures typically employed by 
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with such an approved insurance company is a requirement for 
conducting a bail bond business in New York.8 The bond posted by 
the bondsperson, as agent, is in essence an agreement that the 
insurance company will pay the state the full amount of the bond if 
the defendant fails to appear in court.9 Vanguard and the insurance 
company are betting $2,000 that the accused will make all of his or 
her court appearances10 and they want collateral to back their 
wager.11 The caller will need to come into Vanguard’s office with 
identification, a utility bill, and her most recent paystub.12 The 
judge will want to know who she is, where she lives, and what she 
does for a living, Mr. Medina explains.13 If the defendant appears 
as required by the court throughout the action, the $600 collateral 
                                                          
an International Fidelity Insurance Company agent to determine the sufficiency 
of collateral). 
8 See N.Y. INS. LAW § 6801 (McKinney 2009) (providing that no person, 
firm, or corporation may engage in a bail bond business “[e]xcept for a 
corporation authorized to write fidelity and surety insurance and to do a bail 
bond business pursuant to the provisions of article eleven” of the Insurance 
Law); N.Y. INS. LAW § 6802(a) (McKinney 2009) (“No person, firm or 
corporation or any officer or employee thereof shall act in this state as an agent 
or solicitor of an insurer doing a bail bond business in soliciting, negotiating or 
effectuating any such deposit or bail bond by such insurer unless licensed by the 
superintendent as an agent pursuant to the provisions of this section.”); see also 
Bail Bonds Active Agent Listing, N.Y. INS. DEP’T, https://awebproxyprd.ins. 
state.ny.us/onepage/StartForm.jsp?link=/LICAppsAlice/LIC_BB_Search.jsp 
(choose “Bail Bondsman Type”) (last visited Sept. 15, 2010) (listing insurance 
companies that have agents licensed in New York as well as individual and 
corporate agents). 
9 See Mary T. Phillips, Making Bail in New York City: Commercial Bonds 
and Cash Bail, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., 19, 96 (Mar. 2010), 
http://www.cjareports.org/reports/bailmaking2010.pdf [hereinafter Making Bail 
in New York City]. 
10 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 540.10–.30 (McKinney 2009) (regarding 
bail forfeiture and remission). 
11 See Making Bail in New York City, supra note 9, at 30–34 (discussing 
types and amounts of collateral accepted by bond agents in Manhattan and 
Brooklyn). 
12 Interview with John Medina, supra note 1. 
13 Id.; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.20(4)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2009) 
(providing that a justifying affidavit on an insurance company bail bond must 
include the name, occupation, and residential and business address of each 
indemnitor on the bond).   
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payment will be returned to the caller.14 
Two thousand dollars is a fairly common bail amount.15 In fact, 
it was the median amount set at criminal court arraignments in 
New York City in 2008.16 Because the court is required to take the 
defendant’s criminal history into account when setting bail, the 
amount of bail may not reveal very much about the nature of the 
current offense.17 If the defendant has a prior criminal record, the 
offense might not be particularly serious.18 Since the court set bail 
bond at $2,000, it is possible, though not particularly likely, that a 
cash alternative was set in a lower amount of perhaps $1,000.19 
                                                          
14 See supra note 5 (explaining New York’s statutory limit on bail bonding 
fees). 
15 See Annual Report 2008, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., 21 
(Dec. 2009), http://www.cjareports.org/reports/annual08.pdf (reporting that 
twenty-four percent of New York City bail amounts were set in the range of 
$1,001 to $2,500); see also id. at 22 (explaining that when bond is ordered with 
a lower cash alternative, the agency sometimes reports only the lower amount as 
the bail amount). 
16 Id. at 21. 
17 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(a) (McKinney 2009) (listing the 
possible sentence upon conviction as just one of a variety of factors that the 
court is directed to consider when setting bail). In fact, unlike under federal law, 
where a court is permitted to consider the safety of the community when 
determining whether a defendant should be detained pretrial, see United States 
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of 
preventive detention as provided for in the Bail Reform Act of 1984), New York 
law currently provides that when a court exercises its discretion in setting the 
form or amount of bail, it should take into account only “the kind and degree of 
control or restriction that is necessary to secure his court attendance when 
required.” CRIM. PROC. § 510.30(2)(a); see also CRIM. PROC. § 510.30 cmt.; 
JOHN S. GOLDKAMP ET AL., PERSONAL LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY SAFETY: 
PRETRIAL RELEASE IN THE CRIMINAL COURT 6 (1995) [hereinafter PERSONAL 
LIBERTY]. Nonetheless, a New York court must consider the principal’s 
character and criminal record, CRIM. PROC. § 510.30(2)(a), which could 
indirectly bear on any potential threat an accused’s release might pose to the 
community. 
18 See CRIM. PROC. § 510.30(2)(a)(iv) (providing that the court must take 
into account the defendant’s criminal record in exercising its discretion to set 
bail). But see id. § 510.30(1) (providing that in limited circumstances 
applications for bail must be determined as a matter of law). 
19 See Mary T. Phillips & Elyse J. Revere, Factors Influencing Release and 
Bail Decisions in New York City: Part 1. Manhattan, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
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Regardless of whether a lower cash alternative has been set, a 
defendant who has the financial resources has no need to secure 
pretrial release through a bail bondsperson; that defendant can 
simply put up the full amount in cash,20 avoiding the premium 
charged by the bondsperson.21 
An individual who lacks enough cash to post bail and must 
instead seek out a bondsperson might face two distinct problems. 
First, where bail is set low, it may not be possible to locate a 
bondsperson who is willing to post bond.22 Bondspersons rarely 
ever write bonds for less than $1,000.23 Under a typical agent 
contract, the bondsperson might pocket approximately $345 on a 
$5,000 bond, $150 on a $2,000 bond, and $75 on a $1,000 bond.24 
For the work involved, most bail bond businesses will not see a 
                                                          
AGENCY, INC., 13 (July 2004), http://www.cjareports.org/reports/bail1.pdf 
[hereinafter Factors Part 1]. By observing Manhattan arraignments for seven 
months during 2001 and 2002, the New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc. 
(“CJA”) found that in eighty-three percent of cases no lower cash alternative 
was set, and that when an alternative was set, it was usually at least half of the 
bond amount. Id. at 1, 13. The CJA report notes that a cash alternative is not 
really an alternative to bond unless it is set at less than the amount that a 
bondsperson would require as collateral. Id. at 13. See also Making Bail in New 
York City, supra note 9, at 52–57 (reporting similar results for a 2005 sample). 
20 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.15(1) (McKinney 2009) (providing 
that, where the court has fixed bail, “cash bail in the amount designated in the 
order fixing bail may be posted even though such bail was not specified in such 
order”). 
21 The city does, however, retain a three percent fee when a case ends with 
a conviction. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 99-m (McKinney 2007); What You Should 
Know Before You Pay Bail, N.Y.C. DEP’T FIN. (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.nyc. 
gov/html/dof/html/pdf/07pdf/pay-bail.pdf. 
22 See Making Bail in New York City, supra note 9, at 18. 
23 Id. 
24 On a $5,000 bond, there would be a ten percent premium on the first 
$3,000 and an eight percent premium on the remaining $2,000. See N.Y. INS. 
LAW § 6804(a) (McKinney 2009). The resulting $460 premium would be 
apportioned between the insurance company and the bondsperson in accordance 
with their agent contract. Interview with John Medina, supra note 1; see also 
People v. James, N.Y. L.J., June 3, 1999, at 31, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 
June 3, 1999) (“The proportion of the split is determined through negotiation 
between the agent and the insurance company.”). Accordingly, on the $5,000 
bond, if a contract provided that twenty-five percent of the premium would be 
collected by the insurance company, the bondsperson would collect $345. 
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profit of less than $100 as worth the time or energy.25 Even smaller 
companies, like Mr. Medina’s, have limits on how low a bond they 
will post.26 Bondspersons are businesspeople. With a ten percent 
premium, and a percentage of that premium going to the insurance 
company that is underwriting the bond, it is rarely worth the 
paperwork, time, and gasoline that it takes to bail a person out of 
jail for a profit that could amount to less than $50.27 The second, 
more obvious problem is that even when bail is set in amounts that 
a bondsperson is willing to post, many of the defendants caught in 
New York City’s criminal justice system have difficulty producing 
sufficient collateral.28 They, or their friends or relatives, may lack 
the cash, property, or real estate to secure the bond.29 One of the 
consequences of the current system is that some defendants are 
incarcerated pretrial simply because they cannot afford bail set at 
just a few hundred dollars.30 A New York City Criminal Justice 
                                                          
25 Interview with John Medina, supra note 1. 
26 Id. 
27 A bond of $500 or less would bring a profit of under $50. See supra note 
24 (calculating fee distributions). 
28 See, e.g., Annual Report 2008, supra note 15, at 9 (finding fifty-one 
percent of defendants between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine employed 
full-time); Prisoner Profile, CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y. (Mar. 2006), http://www. 
correctionalassociation.org/publications/download/pvp/factsheets/prisoner_profi
le_2006.pdf; see also Reentry Facts, NAT’L REENTRY RES. CTR., http://www. 
nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/facts (last visited Sept. 15, 2010) (citing high 
instances of mental health issues and substance abuse problems and low rates of 
education and employment among prisoners and jail inmates nationwide).  
29 See Making Bail in New York City, supra note 9, at 30 (showing that, 
typically, Manhattan and Brooklyn bond agents accepted cash collateral alone); 
see also Adam Liptak, World Spurns Bail for Profit, But It’s a Pillar of U.S. 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008, at A1 (“[This Florida bondsman] has 
accepted rugs, an airplane and a winning Rhode Island lottery ticket. But mostly 
he is interested in houses.”). 
30 See, e.g., Mary T. Phillips, Research Brief No. 14: Bail, Detention, & 
Nonfelony Case Outcomes, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., 7 (May 
2007), http://www.cjareports.org/reports/brief14.pdf [hereinafter Research Brief 
No. 14] (“[N]early half of detained defendants [in the sample] served time in jail 
only because they were unable to post bail.”); Annual Report 2008, supra note 
15, at 22 (“The ability to post bail at arraignment was rare even when the 
amount of bail was very low. For cases with bail amounts of $500 or less, bail 
was made at arraignment in 16% of cases.”). 
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Agency, Inc. (“CJA”) study determined that in over a quarter of 
nonfelony cases where bail was set at just $750 or less, detention 
lasted for a week or longer.31 For some defendants, bail set in 
almost any amount can constitute an extreme hardship.32 
In the 1980s, New York City bail bondspersons, also referred 
to as bail bond agents, nearly disappeared, but because the money 
bail system did not disappear with them, levels of pretrial 
incarceration remained high.33 One researcher concluded that the 
role of the commercial bondsperson had decreased so dramatically 
in New York City that “bail bonds were too rare to be of much 
policy relevance.”34 Of much greater significance, the study 
concluded, was the judicial bail determination, particularly, the 
decision whether to set a lower cash alternative.35 Since the time of 
that study, the fee a bondsperson is permitted to charge has 
doubled in most cases, increasing the industry’s profit potential.36 
In March of 2010, the CJA released findings from the first phase of 
an analysis of bail-making in New York City connected to a 
dataset of arrests that occurred over three months in 2005.37 By 
gathering information manually from paper documents maintained 
in courthouses and detention facilities throughout the Bronx, 
Brooklyn, Manhattan, and Queens, researchers collected data on 
the form of bail posted and the amount of cash bondspersons 
                                                          
31 Research Brief No. 14, supra note 30, at 7. 
32 See, e.g., id.; see also infra notes 70–72 and accompanying text (noting 
possible consequences of pretrial incarceration).  
33 See Michele Sviridoff, Bail Bonds and Cash Alternatives: The Influence 
of “Discounts” on Bail-Making in New York City, 11 JUST. SYS. J. 131, 133, 
135, 144–46 (1986). 
34 Id. at 135. The research, which involved matching bail records up with a 
unique CJA dataset, id. at 133–34, revealed that only three percent of defendants 
who made bail used the services of a bondsperson. Id. at 135. 
35 Id. at 141 (“The availability of a cash alternative seems more important 
to a defendant’s bail-making ability than the face amount of the bail set . . . .”). 
36 Compare id. at 145 n.20 (noting that the fee at the time was five percent 
of the bond), with N.Y. INS. LAW § 6804(a) (McKinney 2009) (setting out New 
York’s fee structure for bail bonds). This holds true for most cases, but where 
the bond exceeds $3,000, a slightly lesser amount is charged on the excess. See 
id. 
37 Making Bail in New York City, supra note 9, at 2, 9. 
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collected in fees and collateral.38 The report confirms that bail 
bond agents are more active today than they were in the 1980s;39 
however, there are still many defendants who derive no benefit 
from their existence—those who cannot afford their fee and those 
with very low—and thus unprofitable—bail amounts. 
The debate continues between groups who see the commercial 
bonding industry as unjust and unfair40 and those who see it as a 
public service, or at least a lesser evil—important and effective.41 
A Florida bondsman profiled in the New York Times sums up one 
perspective, saying: “[T]axpayers have to pay for [government 
pretrial release] programs.42 Why should they . . . [w]hen we can 
provide the same service for free[?] I’d rather see the money spent 
in parks, [on] mental health issues, the homeless. Let the private 
sector do it. We do it better.”43 But bondspersons are not providing 
a service for free.44 Defendants—accused of crimes, but not 
convicted—pay them for release.45 And if bondspersons do not 
care to participate when bail is set low, taxpayers still pay to 
incarcerate those individuals who cannot afford to post cash bail on 
their own.46 Nonetheless, just four states have abolished the 
                                                          
38 Id. at 6, 9. 
39 Id. at 67. 
40 See, e.g., Advocacy Brief: The Truth About Commercial Bail Bonding in 
America, NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES 1–4 (Aug. 2009), 
http://www.napsa.org/publications/napsafandp1.pdf [hereinafter Advocacy 
Brief]. 
41 See generally Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Fugitive: 
Evidence on Public Versus Private Law Enforcement from Bail Jumping, 47 J.L. 
& ECON. 93 (2004) (purporting not to take sides in the debate, but offering data 
to show that the commercial bonding industry is effective). 
42 Pretrial programs vary widely in the types of services they provide. See 
JOHN CLARK & D. ALAN HENRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL SERVICES 
PROGRAMMING AT THE START OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A SURVEY OF PRETRIAL 
SERVICES PROGRAMS 1, 39–42 (2003) (explaining that some programs are 
limited to collecting and verifying information about defendants, whereas others 
are engaged in pretrial supervision of varying degrees of intensity). 
43 Liptak, supra note 29. 
44 See, e.g., Making Bail in New York City, supra note 9, at 28 (reporting 
that bond agents generally charge the maximum fee permitted by law). 
45 See, e.g., id. 
46 See, e.g., Cost of Pre-Trial Detention in City Jails Takes Bite Out of Big 
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commercial bail system—Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon, and 
Wisconsin.47 Nationally, reliance on commercial bail remains 
high.48   
While some continue to call for more systemic reform, others 
have tried to affect change through the money bail system itself.49 
By investing money to bail the indigent out of jail, these activists 
may not achieve the fundamental reform that many advocates 
prefer,50 but the tactic has the more immediate benefit of helping 
defendants to obtain their release. In Bail Out: The Community 
                                                          
Apple’s Budget, N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE (Jan. 24, 2000), http://www.ibo. 
nyc.ny.us/publicationsSocialCommunity.html (follow “Cost of Pre-Trial 
Detention in City Jails Takes Bite Out of Big Apple’s Budget” hyperlink under 
“Criminal Justice”). 
47 Advocacy Brief, supra note 40, at 4. Reliance on commercial bail is far 
from inevitable. See F. E. DEVINE, COMMERCIAL BAIL BONDING: A 
COMPARISON OF COMMON LAW ALTERNATIVES 15 (1991) (“[O]nly one country, 
the Philippines, has adopted a commercial bail bonding system similar to the 
American system.”). Some common law countries have even made profiting 
from posting another’s bail a crime. Id. However, in the United States, as the 
country grew through the 1800s, professional bondspersons took over the role 
that friends and family had once filled, returning defendants to court if they 
failed to appear. See Rebecca B. Fisher, The History of American Bounty 
Hunting as a Study in Stunted Legal Growth, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 199, 208 (2009) (“[I]t was no longer sensible to insist on the 
personalized surety system, as people lived in communities in which their 
neighbors were strangers and their families were often in other states or other 
countries.”). The United States Supreme Court affirmed the bondsperson’s 
power, based in contract, to return the accused to court in Taylor v. Taintor, 83 
U.S. 366 (1872). Id. at 209. 
48 See THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 1, 4 (2007). “In 
the United States, the use of commercial bail bonds is rising, and they became 
the most popular form of pretrial release in 1998. More than 40 percent of 
felony defendants released before trial paid a bail bond company in 2004, up 
from 24 percent a decade earlier, according to the Justice Department.” Liptak, 
supra note 29.  
49 See infra discussion accompanying notes 51–57, 103, 128, 145, 152–55. 
50 See Peggy M. Tobolowsky & James F. Quinn, Pretrial Release in the 
1990s: Texas Takes Another Look at Nonfinancial Release Conditions, 19 NEW 
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 267, 279 n.51 (1993) (explaining that 
some reformers feel that bailing defendants out directly “would only perpetuate 
the reliance on financial conditions of release”). 
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Bail Fund Organizing Manual, Marc Mauer addresses this point.51 
“[W]hy then did we start a bail fund that accepted the existence of 
the money bail system?” he asks; “[b]ecause it’s there.”52 
With that view in mind, this Note contrasts two efforts to 
combat the inequities of the pretrial process by working through 
New York’s bail system,53 and discusses one of these efforts in 
relation to concerns that were raised in the summer of 2009 by a 
Bronx County Supreme Court judge in People v. Miranda.54 The 
earlier effort, the Vera Institute of Justice’s (“Vera’s”) nonprofit, 
licensed bail bond agencies, was a collaborative experiment 
intended to assist certain high-risk defendants by posting their bail 
pretrial in exchange for their agreement to abide by a strict 
supervised release program.55 The second, more recent effort is 
called the Bronx Freedom Fund (the “Freedom Fund”), a nonprofit 
bail fund set up by the Bronx Defenders.56 It was also developed to 
assume responsibility for the pretrial release of certain defendants 
who would otherwise face pretrial incarceration simply because 
they could not afford bail.57 While the Freedom Fund’s model is 
very different from the Bronx agency that Vera closed in 1994,58 
the challenges that Vera faced may help to explain why the 
relatively modest idea of a bail fund could more cost-effectively 
help a greater number of indigent pretrial detainees. However, in 
rejecting bail that had been posted by the Freedom Fund on the 
grounds that the organization was operating as an unlicensed bail 
                                                          
51 MARC MAUER, BAIL OUT: THE COMMUNITY BAIL FUND ORGANIZING 
MANUAL 2 (1980) (writing about the American Friends Service Committee’s 
Washtenaw Community Bail Fund in Ann Arbor, Michigan). 
52 Id. at 5. “Until the time when we are able to change the money bail 
system, people will still be suffering . . . and languishing in jail. . . . [B]y 
demonstrating that a citizens’ group can get involved in the bail process, we 
hoped to show that bail bondsmen were not essential to the system.” Id. 
53 See discussion infra Parts II–III. 
54 See generally People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 WL 2170254 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County June 22, 2009) (rejecting bail posted by the Bronx 
Freedom Fund on legal and policy grounds). 
55 See discussion infra Part II. 
56 See discussion infra Part III. 
57 See infra text accompanying notes 128–29. 
58 See infra text accompanying notes 181–91 (comparing the Freedom 
Fund with Vera’s bail bond agencies). 
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bond business under New York’s Insurance Law,59 the Bronx 
court, in People v. Miranda, raised concerns about the Freedom 
Fund’s methods and its connection with the Bronx Defenders.60 
Part I of this Note will describe the significance of the pretrial 
period to accused individuals, along with some of the early efforts 
to make the pretrial system more equitable and the limits of those 
efforts. Part II will discuss Vera’s bail bond agencies, which 
attempted to assist a high-risk portion of the pretrial population. 
Part III analyzes the policy concerns that the Bronx court raised in 
People v. Miranda61 and discusses why certain aspects of the 
Freedom Fund’s model, some of which were disapproved by the 
court, could allow it to perform well in the Bronx, where Vera’s 
bail bond agency did not. This Note concludes that the court’s 
concern regarding the criteria employed by the Freedom Fund to 
select defendants is one that might be addressed effectively by a 
bail fund through careful structuring and a stricter client selection 
process. In order to win judicial support, a bail fund may need to 
set firmer criteria to guide its determination to post bail at no 
expense to its clients. This is perhaps especially so where the fund 
shares a connection to a particular defense organization—a 
relationship that might give rise to more judicial concern. 
I. SIGNIFICANCE AND BACKGROUND OF THE MOVEMENT TO 
REFORM OUR PRETRIAL SYSTEM  
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the 
pretrial stage is the “most critical period” for an accused to prepare 
a defense.62 Research shows that individuals who are incarcerated 
pretrial regularly receive more severe sentences than defendants 
who are released on recognizance63 or affordable bail.64 Even 
                                                          
59 Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *1, *10. 
60 See generally id. 
61 Id. 
62 See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The 
Illusory Right to Counsel at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1, 2 
(1998) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)). 
63 Release on recognizance means that a defendant is released based on his 
or her personal promise to return to court as required. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 
LAW § 500.10(2) (McKinney 2009) (“A court releases a principal on his own 
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“affordable bail” may be out of reach for an indigent defendant.65 
The problem the indigent defendant faces is compounded when, as 
a result of pretrial incarceration, he or she may be exposed to the 
possibility of a more severe case outcome.66 Moreover, indigent 
defendants who are incarcerated pretrial frequently would not have 
had to serve any extended time in jail but for their inability to post 
bail.67 One study reported that forty-eight percent of nonfelony 
defendants who were detained pretrial were ultimately acquitted, 
had their cases dismissed, or received noncustodial sentences.68 
That period of pretrial detention can last for months.69 This time 
spent in jail not only hinders the accused’s defense, it disrupts 
work, school, social relationships, and any physical or 
psychological treatment.70 Because some defendants are unable to 
post bail, but are desperate to avoid incarceration, they may plead 
guilty to crimes they did not commit, or to charges that might 
                                                          
recognizance when, having acquired control over his person, it permits him to be 
at liberty during the pendency of the criminal action or proceeding involved 
upon condition that he will appear thereat whenever his attendance may be 
required and will at all times render himself amenable to the orders and 
processes of the court.”). 
64 Colbert, supra note 62, at 13. Some researchers have hypothesized that it 
is the probable case outcome that affects a judge’s decision to remand or set 
bail. Research Brief No. 14, supra note 30, at 1. However, recent research on 
New York City defendants supports the hypothesis that pretrial detention does 
have a negative impact on both felony and nonfelony case outcomes. Id. at 7; 
Mary T. Phillips, Research Brief No. 18: Bail, Detention, & Felony Case 
Outcomes, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., 5–7 (Sept. 2008), 
http://www.cjareports.org/reports/brief18.pdf [hereinafter Research Brief No. 
18]. 
65 See sources cited supra notes 28, 30. 
66 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
67 Research Brief No. 14, supra note 30, at 7. 
68 Id. A similar result was found for the felony sample, where “[n]early half 
of the detained . . . were either not convicted (27%) or received a noncustodial 
sentence (19%).” Research Brief No. 18, supra note 64, at 7. 
69 E.g., Colbert, supra note 62, at 4 (“[The] pretrial prison system [is] 
bursting at its seams with poor people awaiting trial.”); Read More, BRONX 
FREEDOM FUND, http://www.bronxfreedomfund.org/read-more.html (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2010). 
70 Colbert, supra note 62, at 43; Read More, BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra 
note 69. 
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otherwise be lessened or dropped.71 The consequences of the 
criminal record and possible lengthy probation that results from 
such a plea can be severe, threatening job prospects, leading to loss 
of public benefits, disrupting families, and affecting immigration 
status.72 The costs of pretrial detention on taxpayers are 
substantial;73 the costs on the defendants and their families may be 
devastating.74 
In 1961, the Vera Institute of Justice, through the Manhattan 
Bail Project, set out to show that rather than depending on financial 
bail to ensure a defendant’s appearance in court, the strength of a 
defendant’s community ties could serve as a strong basis for 
release on recognizance,75 a method commonly known as ROR. 
The success of Vera’s method,76 which involved verifying 
defendants’ background information and assigning a numerical 
                                                          
71 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2468, 2491–93, 2493 n.116, 2540 (2004); Read More, 
BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra note 69. The undue pressure that pretrial 
detention can put on a defendant to plead guilty can be particularly severe for 
those accused of less serious offenses. Research Brief No. 14, supra note 30, at 7 
(“A defendant facing a conditional discharge, a fine, or a sentence of time 
served—unlike a defendant facing serious jail or prison time—can gain 
immediate release by pleading guilty. This creates a strong incentive to do so.”).  
72 See generally Collateral Consequences of Criminal Charges: New York 
State, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, http://www2.law.columbia.edu/fourcs/ (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2010) (providing information and links to other resources 
concerning collateral consequences in New York). 
73 See, e.g., source cited supra note 46; see also Basic Prison and Jail Fact 
Sheet, CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y. (Mar. 2006), http://www.correctionalassociation. 
org/publications/download/pvp/factsheets/basic_prison_fact_2006.pdf (“It costs 
the city about $59,900 a year to keep an inmate in a New York City Jail.”) 
(emphasis removed); Colbert, supra note 62, at 42. 
74 See supra text accompanying notes 70–72. 
75 A Short History of Vera’s Work on the Judicial Process, VERA INST. OF 
JUSTICE, 2 (June 2003), http://www.vera.org/download?file=403/hist_summ_ 
judicial_process.pdf [hereinafter VERA 2003]. 
76 Id. (“[T]he experimental group released on nothing more than their 
promise to return had twice the appearance rate of those released on bail. The 
project also saved more than $1 million in the correction department’s budget.”); 
see also Don Oberdorfer, The Bail-Bond Scandal, SATURDAY EVENING POST, 
June 20, 1964, at 66, 66–67 (describing the positive impact of Vera’s efforts). 
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score for judicial reference, helped lead to national reform.77 These 
pretrial services comprised a mechanism upon which judges could 
rely to make more informed release decisions.78 Because it is time 
consuming and somewhat unreliable for a judge to make a detailed 
inquiry into a defendant’s background at an initial appearance, 
judges often depend on straightforward criteria when making their 
bail determination.79 An absence of such criteria and an overall 
lack of available information can contribute to inconsistent 
decision making.80 That reality prompted bail projects like Vera’s, 
which were designed to accurately assess defendants’ backgrounds 
and community ties for the purpose of developing release 
recommendations.81 One of the objectives of this movement was to 
“incorporate explicit, objective criteria into pretrial decision 
making . . . with the [aim of] . . . minimizing the disparate 
outcomes resulting from arbitrary and subjective decisions.”82 
In New York City, Vera’s efforts led to the creation of the 
CJA, a nonprofit corporation that exists today under contract with 
the city.83 Through personal interviews, CJA collects information 
relating to criminal court defendants’ employment, residency, 
family status, prior convictions, and appearance history, however, 
not all of the information is used to calculate the objective score 
that forms the basis of CJA’s release recommendation.84 Following 
                                                          
77 See VERA 2003, supra note 75, at 2 (referring to the federal Bail Reform 
Act of 1966). Caleb Foote credited Vera’s “remarkable reform efforts” with 
sparking change in the area of bail. See CALEB FOOTE ET AL., STUDIES ON BAIL, 
at v (Caleb Foote ed., 1966). 
78 Oberdorfer, supra note 76, at 66 (explaining that while judges had the 
power to release defendants without bail, they rarely did so because they lacked 
sufficient information upon which to base that determination). 
79 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 4 CRIM. PROC. § 12.1(b) (3d ed. West 2008). 
80 See Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., The Development & Validation of 
a Pretrial Screening Tool, 72 FED. PROBATION 2, 3 (2008). 
81 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 79, § 12.1(b). 
82 Lowenkamp et al., supra note 80, at 3. 
83 About the Agency, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY, INC., http://www.nycja. 
org/about/about.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). The agency was originally 
established in 1973 as the Pretrial Services Agency and today exists under 
contract with New York City’s Office of the Coordinator for Criminal Justice. 
Id. 
84 See Annual Report 2008, supra note 15, at 5, 13. Much of the 
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the current mandate of New York’s Criminal Procedure Law,85 
CJA has made release recommendations based on what the agency 
understands to reflect a defendant’s risk of flight, rather than 
community safety concerns.86 Nonetheless, in what CJA described 
as a “source of some frustration,” research completed before 2005 
indicated that prosecutors’ bail requests were the only significant 
predictor of bail amount, and a potent factor in ROR 
determinations.87 Because other CJA research shows that 
prosecutors’ bail requests are generally informed by factors other 
than likelihood of court appearance, bail determinations are 
probably based upon community safety and other concerns despite 
the mandate of the statute.88 Some judges acknowledged to CJA 
that they have disregarded the agency’s recommendation because it 
failed to reflect factors they feel are important.89 In June of 2003, 
two criminal history elements were added to CJA’s adult 
                                                          
information that is not used to calculate the objective score is used for research 
purposes or to assess a defendant’s social service needs. See id. at 5. To 
determine whether an adult defendant is categorized as low risk, moderate risk, 
high risk, or no recommendation, points are awarded or subtracted for (i) a 
working telephone number, (ii) a New York City area address, (iii) full time 
employment, school, or training program, (iv) someone expected at arraignment, 
(v) any open cases, and (vi) any prior bench warrants. See id. CJA’s most recent 
available annual report, from 2008, shows that sixty-five percent of defendants 
whose cases were not disposed of at arraignment (which was about half of all 
cases), were released on recognizance and bail was set for thirty-four percent. 
Id. at 16. The remaining one percent was remanded without bail. Id. 
85 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2) (McKinney 2009). 
86 Qudsia Siddiqi, Research Brief No. 19: Pretrial Failure Among New 
York City Defendants, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., 1, 7 (Jan. 2009), 
http://www.cjareports.org/reports/brief19.pdf.  
87 Mary T. Phillips, Research Brief No. 9: Prosecutors’ Bail Requests and 
the CJA Recommendation: What Do They Tell the Judge?, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., 2 (Aug. 2005), http://www.cjareports.org/reports/brief9. 
pdf [hereinafter Research Brief No. 9]. 
88 See id. at 7. 
89 Factors Part 1, supra note 19, at 48. Since that time, some factors have 
been changed to better reflect judicial concerns. See id. In 2008, of those 
defendants who CJA recommended for ROR, eighty-one percent were granted 
it. Annual Report 2008, supra note 15, at 19. On the other hand, forty-three 
percent of defendants who were not recommended for release by CJA were 
granted ROR. Id. 
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recommendation system—whether the defendant has (1) any prior 
bench warrants or (2) open cases90—but CJA does not consider 
offense type or severity in its recommendation.91 More judges may 
now give weight to CJA’s score in light of the changes the agency 
made to their objective criteria.92 But the inconsistent use of CJA’s 
recommendations highlights the fact that release and bail-setting 
decisions are judicial determinations.93 If judicial opinion is not 
aligned with the agency’s assessment criteria, the effect of the 
service is diluted. A similar result occurs when judges do not 
exercise their statutorily granted discretion to set bail in less 
burdensome forms.94 Statutory authority for setting less onerous 
types of bail, such as unsecured bonds,95 makes little difference if 
judges rarely exercise those options. 
                                                          
90 Research Brief No. 9, supra note 87, at 3.  
91 See id. at 7. 
92 See Factors Part 1, supra note 19, at 48. 
93 See John S. Goldkamp, Judicial Responsibility for Pretrial Release 
Decisionmaking and the Information Role of Pretrial Services, 57 FED. 
PROBATION 28, 29 (1993) [hereinafter Judicial Responsibility]. 
94 See Making Bail in New York City, supra note 9, at 3; see also Research 
Brief No. 18, supra note 64, at 7 (“More use could be made of cash alternatives 
and rarely used bail options such as personal recognizance bonds for . . . low- 
and medium-risk defendants if ROR is not appropriate.”); Peter A. Crusco, 
Uncovering Tainted Bail, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 20, 2004, at 4, col. 4 (“New York 
gives preferential treatment to insurance company bail bonds as compared to the 
other types of statutory bail.”); Martha Rayner, Conference Report: New York 
City’s Criminal Courts: Are We Achieving Justice?, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1023, 1046 (2004) (observing that more research should be done to “explore the 
feasibility of the increased use of non-traditional, though statutorily based, bail 
options, such as secured and unsecured bonds”). 
95 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 500.10, 520.10 (McKinney 2009); see 
also CRIM. PROC. § 520.10 cmt. (“By amendment in 1972, the Legislature 
reversed [the] presumption so that now . . . when the court fails to specify, the 
defendant may post unsecured bail in the least onerous form—i.e., an unsecured 
surety bond or an appearance bond secured only by the defendant’s promise to 
pay. However it is doubtful that the defendant would receive this largess by 
oversight, since the court must approve the form in which the bail is posted prior 
to release of the principal.”) (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.40). 
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II. A NEW TACTIC: VERA’S BAIL BOND AGENCIES 
While Vera’s efforts did spur the movement toward more 
nonfinancial pretrial release,96 the community ties model has a 
somewhat obvious limit. Those who lack financial resources 
frequently lack strong community ties; the two characteristics are 
often directly related.97 
[The model] had little relevance to the type of person most 
commonly processed by the criminal courts. These 
defendants often had no jobs, no good record of 
employment, no stable residence, no upstanding 
community members to vouch for their reliability, and little 
education. In short, just as they were unlikely to be able to 
post very low amounts of cash bail, they were also unlikely 
to receive high community-ties ratings to earn 
recommendations for release on personal recognizance 
(nonfinancial release).98 
Vera undoubtedly recognized this problem and in the mid-
1980s began to focus its pretrial efforts on a different segment of 
the defendant population.99 From 1987 to 1994, Vera established 
three nonprofit bail bond agencies to post bond at no cost for 
certain defendants who had been denied ROR.100 In exchange, 
each defendant signed a contract agreeing to take part in an 
intensive pretrial supervision program, which involved daily 
physical monitoring of participants.101 The intensive supervision 
                                                          
96 See CLARK & HENRY, supra note 42, at 1 (“[H]undreds of pretrial 
programs have been established in rural, suburban, and urban jurisdictions.”). 
97 See, e.g., PERSONAL LIBERTY, supra note 17, at vii. 
98 Id. 
99 See Christopher Stone, Forward to Bail Bond Supervision in Three 
Counties, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE (Aug. 1995), http://www.vera.org/download? 
file=73/bailbond.pdf. 
100 Id. 
101 Id.; Bail Bond Supervision in Three Counties, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, 1, 
23 (Aug. 1995), http://www.vera.org/download?file=73/bailbond.pdf 
[hereinafter VERA 1995] (“Vera’s bail bond supervision projects [were] among 
the most intensive community supervision programs ever attempted.”); VERA 
2003, supra note 75, at 3 (“[The program involved] an initial period in a 24-hour 
residence, drug testing, curfews, unannounced home visits, and job monitoring. 
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was intended both to deter misconduct and to give staff notice if 
there was reason to return a participant to jail.102 In order to post 
bonds and to exercise this authority, some staff became licensed 
bail bond agents.103 For the population that the agencies were 
working with, the possibility of returning a defendant to custody 
was important for the message it sent to both the defendant and the 
Department of Correction—that “the program was serious about 
controlling behavior and preserving community safety.”104 
Vera sought to create “a pretrial supervision program so good 
that it [could] compete with jail—one that [could] virtually 
guarantee that defendants under supervision [would] neither 
abscond nor commit new crimes.”105 This kind of supervised 
release as an alternative to pretrial detention raises some concerns. 
One of the most troubling aspects of pretrial detention is that it in 
effect punishes a defendant before he or she has been convicted of 
a crime.106 When, for a defendant who cannot afford bail, the 
alternative to pretrial incarceration is intensive supervised release, 
that defendant’s freedom is still restricted in a way that it would 
not have been if the defendant had been able to post bail.107 Even 
when participants voluntarily agree to comply with this type of 
program, it is questionable whether a detained person meaningfully 
consents to the restrictive conditions the program imposes when he 
or she has so few alternatives.108 On the other hand, for the 
population of “high-risk” defendants with whom Vera was 
                                                          
Most important, the defendants agreed that the agency could return them to jail 
if they failed to comply.”). 
102 Stone, supra note 99. 
103 Id. 
104 VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 7. 
105 Stone, supra note 99. 
106 See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text (describing consequences 
of pretrial detention). 
107 See supra note 101 (describing strict restrictions on participants’ daily 
lives).  
108 For a discussion of the constitutional issues that are raised by this 
problem and the “tension created when an arrested person is asked to chose 
between sacrificing the privacy rights he normally enjoys . . . and forgoing an 
opportunity to avoid indefinite pretrial detention” in the federal context, see 
generally Melanie D. Wilson, The Price of Pretrial Release: Can We Afford to 
Keep Our Fourth Amendment Rights?, 92 IOWA L. REV. 159 (2006). 
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working,109 this kind of supervision afforded participants an 
opportunity not just to avoid pretrial detention, but also to connect 
with treatment and training programs and, most importantly, to 
demonstrate to the judge that, if convicted, a jail sentence would be 
unnecessary.110 Still, Vera reported that “[i]n some cases, the 
Bronx Bail Bond Agency was supervising defendants long after 
they would have been released from jail had they not been bailed 
out by the agency.”111 
Apart from liberty and due process concerns,112 the length of 
time that participants were subject to supervision also posed 
practical difficulties.113 The release contracts included a detailed 
schedule of all required and permitted activities; minor breaches of 
the contract led to even more restrictions.114 Particularly in the 
Bronx, where the period of supervision was especially long, 
defendants’ commitment to their rigid schedules waned over the 
lengthy pretrial period.115 But it was one of Vera’s goals to target 
                                                          
109 Some participants were homeless, many had criminal records, and most 
had substance abuse problems. VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 5. 
110 See Stone, supra note 99. One author has observed: 
[I]f programs of supervised release were truly alternatives to pretrial 
custody, and did not result in widening the net so as to control 
defendants who previously would not have even been detained, and if 
defendants in the supervised programs can have their cases dismissed 
without prejudice if they successfully complete them, the idea might be 
worth exploring. None of that will erase the fact, however, that 
significant intrusions into citizen’s lives are being made previous to 
trial and without criminal convictions. This fact might be 
insurmountable for those who would design new alternatives in pretrial 
release today.  
Candace McCoy, Tribute, Caleb Was Right: Pretrial Decisions Determine 
Mostly Everything, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 135, 144–45 (2007). 
111 VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 21. 
112 See generally Wilson, supra note 108. 
113 See VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 20. 
114 Id. at 6. 
115 Id. at 20 (“The Bronx District Attorney’s office proved unwilling to 
reward compliant defendants with probation. As a result, defendants in the 
program delayed the disposition of their cases . . . . Extending the duration of 
supervision dramatically increased the surrender rate . . . . As people became 
more frustrated by what seemed to be a pointless as well as endless situation, 
they broke more and more rules.”). 
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people who “would represent a net savings in corrections 
resources.”116 To that end, Vera offered to supervise defendants 
who were likely to be detained for at least ninety days before trial 
and who were eligible for probation.117 That way, space was not 
only saved pretrial, but when defendants successfully complied 
with pretrial supervision they were more likely to receive 
probation at sentencing.118 Because supervising defendants so 
closely cost as much as incarceration, it was the prospect of 
achieving a non-jail sentence that could make the largely 
government-funded program cost-effective.119 What Vera’s reports 
make fairly clear is that its goal was not to get as many individuals 
out of jail as possible.120 Vera was working with the city to craft an 
alternative to pretrial incarceration for people who were unlikely to 
benefit from the movement toward personal recognizance.121   
Vera’s Bail Bond Agencies reached out to a population of 
                                                          
116 Id. at 1. 
117 Id. Vera’s 1995 report on the projects explains that “[s]imply put, it 
doesn’t save money to remove people from jail who later receive jail sentences 
because pretrial detention is deducted from the sentence.” Id. at 3. This 
statement may not account for the possibility that removing people who are 
ineligible for probation from jail could result in acquittal, dismissal, or a shorter 
jail sentence overall. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing 
evidence of more favorable case outcomes when defendants are released 
pretrial). Vera also observed that “[r]eleasing 100 defendants, who each would 
have spent two days in jail, saves 200 bed days; releasing two people, who each 
would have spent 100 days in jail, conserves the same amount of space.”  VERA 
1995, supra note 101, at 3. If Vera had targeted short-term detainees it 
presumably would have been able to assist more individuals. This alternative 
approach would have required supervising a greater number of defendants, but 
each individual would probably have required less oversight because the 
relationship between the defendant and project staff would have less time to 
become strained. On the other hand, long-term detainees stand to gain the most 
when supervision is effective.  
118 Stone, supra note 99 (“[A] defendant’s good behavior and achievements 
while under supervision helped persuade prosecutors and judges to impose a 
sentence of probation.”); VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 2. 
119 VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 5 (stating that Vera’s model was “as 
expensive as jail”). 
120 See supra discussion accompanying notes 114–19. 
121 See supra text accompanying notes 97–98 (noting that some defendants 
would not benefit from the ROR movement). 
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defendants who faced extreme challenges.122 Even in Nassau 
County, twenty-seven percent of participants in the bail project 
were surrendered and four percent were rearrested.123 In the Bronx, 
too many people had to be surrendered for the program to be 
workable124 and so the Bronx agency was closed in 1994.125 In 
2007, another group of advocates launched a different project in 
the Bronx, with different goals and on a more modest scale. 
III. THE BRONX FREEDOM FUND 
The Bronx Defenders is a public defenders practice that, in 
addition to providing indigent defense, works to address the 
various civil and social service needs of their clients.126 Many of 
the Bronx Defenders’ indigent clients cannot afford even very low 
bail.127 After years of seeing clients in jail pretrial, sometimes for 
lack of even a few hundred dollars, and witnessing many plead 
                                                          
122 VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 5. 
123 Id. at 4 n.6. Two percent of Nassau participants absconded. Id. The 
agencies in Nassau County, New York and Essex County, New Jersey 
ultimately lost no bonds and were incorporated into nonprofit organizations with 
county contracts. VERA 2003, supra note 75, at 3. Vera reported that the Nassau 
County project was transferred to the Education and Assistance Corporation in 
1992 and the Essex County project was transferred to Volunteers of America in 
1993. Id. at 13. 
124 VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 19–21. In the Bronx, forty-nine percent 
of participants were surrendered, id. at 7, twelve percent were rearrested, and 
five percent absconded. Id. at 15. 
125 VERA 2003, supra note 75, at 3.  
126 Advocacy for Clients, BRONX DEFENDERS, http://www.bronxdefenders. 
org/our-work/advocacy-for-clients (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). This “holistic” 
approach is based on the experience that most of their clients’ criminal cases are 
symptoms of more complicated and long-term problems. See id.; see also We 
Stabilize Lives Through Civil Advocacy, BRONX DEFENDERS, http://www.bronx 
defenders.org/our-work/we-stabilize-lives-through-civil-advocacy (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2010) (describing provision of services for issues such as employment, 
housing, health, and addiction). 
127 Robin Steinberg & Zoë Towns, The Bronx Freedom Fund: A Model 
Bail Fund, CORNERSTONE (Nat’l Legal Aid & Defender Ass’n, Washington, 
D.C.), Jan.–Apr. 2009, at 21; Read More, BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra note 69 
(“More than half of the Bronx defendants who have bail set remain behind bars 
for their entire pretrial period.”). 
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guilty just to avoid that time in jail, the Bronx Defenders set up a 
project called the Bronx Freedom Fund—a revolving bail fund that 
would provide bail at no cost to clients who met certain criteria.128 
The hope of the project was that those defendants would be able to 
achieve a more favorable result in their criminal matter and avoid 
the severe consequences of pretrial detention, while obtaining 
social services earlier in the process.129 The Bronx Freedom Fund’s 
website states that since opening in 2007, ninety-three percent of 
the defendants who benefited from the fund made all of their court 
appearances and over fifty percent of cases “were dismissed or 
resulted in a non-criminal disposition.”130 A project of this kind 
depends on a high success rate because when a case closes with the 
defendant having made all court appearances, bail is returned and 
the fund is replenished—hence the revolving nature of the fund.131 
By June of 2009, the Bronx Freedom Fund had posted bail for 
approximately 130 indigent clients.132 However, that same month a 
judge in Bronx County Supreme Court rejected bail that had been 
posted for a defendant by the Freedom Fund.133 In an unreported 
decision, People v. Miranda, the court found that the Bronx 
Freedom Fund had “become a ‘bail bond business’ as well as an 
‘insurance business’ as defined in Insurance Law § 6801 [and, 
                                                          
128 See Steinberg & Towns, supra note 127, at 21; Read More, BRONX 
FREEDOM FUND, supra note 69. See also infra notes 252–53 and accompanying 
text (discussing the criteria used).  
129 See Read More, BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra note 69. 
130 Id. But see People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 WL 2170254, at 
*10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County June 22, 2009) (“[The Freedom Fund] does 
not apparently keep statistics about whether a judge agreed to stay the issuance 
of a warrant upon request of the Bronx Defenders’ attorney . . . and the District 
Attorney’s Office challenges the validity of this statistic.”). 
131 Read More, BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra note 69; see also What You 
Should Know Before You Pay Bail, supra note 21 (explaining the process for 
return of bail funds by the Department of Finance and that pursuant to section 
99-m of the General Municipal Law, the Department will retain a three percent 
fee when a case ends with a conviction). 
132 Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *8 (finding that from the time of its 
incorporation to the time of the decision, bail had been posted for approximately 
130 Bronx Defenders’ clients). 
133 Id. at *1. 
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therefore], it had to be licensed.”134 In consequence, the court 
rejected the bail posted for the Bronx Defenders’ client “on both 
legal and public policy grounds.”135  
In defining a “bail bond business,” section 6801(a)(1) of the 
New York Insurance Law states that:  
[a]ny person, firm or corporation in any court having 
criminal jurisdiction or in any criminal action or proceeding 
who shall for another deposit money or property as bail . . . 
who within a period of one month prior thereto shall have 
made such a deposit or given such bail in more than two 
cases not arising out of the same transaction shall be 
deemed to be doing a bail bond business and doing an 
insurance business as defined in article eleven of this 
chapter.136 
New York’s law further provides that no person or entity shall 
engage in such business unless licensed to do so.137 In People v. 
Miranda, the Bronx County Supreme Court found that the Bronx 
Freedom Fund had posted bail in eight cases within the thirty day 
period prior to posting bail for the defendant.138 Therefore, the 
court determined, the organization was operating as a bail bond 
business and an insurance business under the law and it had to be 
licensed.139 The Miranda court reasoned that the violation cast the 
validity of the bail into question.140   
To call a charitable bail fund a bail bond business is 
counterintuitive. The term “bail bond business” suggests that the 
person or entity posting bail must intend to profit from the 
undertaking. But elsewhere the insurance law provides that “the 
fact that no profit is derived from the making of insurance 
contracts, agreements or transactions, or that no separate or direct 
                                                          
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 N.Y. INS. LAW § 6801(a)(1) (McKinney 2009). 
137 Id. § 6801(b)(1) (“No person, firm or corporation shall in this state do 
an insurance business or a bail bond business as defined in subsection (a) of this 
section unless authorized by a license issued and in force as provided under 
article eleven of this chapter.”). 
138 Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *11. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
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consideration is received therefor, shall not be deemed 
conclusively to show that the making thereof does not constitute 
the doing of an insurance business.”141 Nor is the definition of 
“bail bond business” limited to those posting bond, as opposed to 
those “deposit[ing] money or property as bail.”142 This definition 
could be interpreted expansively enough to require licensing of 
almost any person or entity that regularly posts bail.143  
However, bail funds are not an unknown phenomenon in New 
York.144 The Bronx court acknowledged that “[i]n New York 
State, several organizations, including the United Way of 
Tompkins County, which has loaned bail money to defendants, and 
Catholic Charities of Onondaga County, which posted half the bail, 
have administered bail funds with money appropriated by the local 
county legislatures.”145 The Bronx Freedom Fund’s counsel 
suggested, reasonably, that if such organizations regularly post 
bail, apparently with local legislative sanction, then it too should 
be permitted to post cash bail without being subject to the licensing 
requirement of the insurance law.146 The Freedom Fund pointed to 
section 4522(a)(3) of the New York Insurance Law,147 which 
exempts from the requirements of the insurance law, particularly 
licensing requirements, “[o]rganizations of a religious, charitable, 
benevolent or fraternal character, which are not organized or 
maintained primarily for the purpose of providing insurance 
                                                          
141 N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101(b)(4) (McKinney 2009). 
142 See supra note 136 and accompanying text (defining “bail bond 
business”). 
143 The law requiring licensing of bondspersons does explicitly provide a 
limited exception for insurers authorized to issue policies of motor vehicle and 
aircraft insurance who “undertake[] to pay . . . the cost of bail bonds required of 
the insured because of accident or asserted traffic law violations arising out of 
the use of a vehicle insured under the terms of the policy.” N.Y. INS. LAW 
§ 6802(o) (McKinney 2009). 
144 See infra notes 145, 154 and accompanying text. 
145 Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *10. Opportunities, Alternatives, and 
Resources of Tompkins County Inc., which administers a Bail Funds Program 
with public and private money is an independent nonprofit agency. See OAR, 
http://www.oartompkins.com/index.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
146 Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *15 n.23. 
147 Id. at *2. 
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benefits.”148 The court determined that despite the charitable nature 
of the Freedom Fund,149 since it was “organized [and] maintained 
primarily for the purpose of providing”150 bail, the exemption did 
not apply.151  
Though the Miranda decision is not binding on other courts, its 
interpretation of the insurance law raises interesting questions. 
Aside from charitable purposes, bail funds have historical and 
political significance. Bail funds have been utilized by suppressed 
groups, including civil rights activists and communists.152 In the 
1960s, bail funds played an instrumental role in the civil rights 
movement.153 During the 1970s, Professor Angela Y. Davis, a 
feminist and human rights activist, was involved in organizing a 
bail fund for sex workers in New York’s Women’s House of 
                                                          
148 N.Y. INS. LAW § 4522(a)(3) (McKinney 2009). 
149 The Bronx Freedom Fund’s certificate of incorporation, filed with the 
Secretary of State, indicates that the fund operates for “charitable purposes.” 
Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *4. 
150 INS. LAW § 4522(a)(3). 
151 Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *15. According to the opinion, at some 
point counsel for the Bronx Freedom Fund acknowledged on the record that the 
exemption did not apply to the nonprofit, despite earlier advice from another law 
firm to the contrary. Id. at *3. Subsequently, the Freedom Fund invoked the 
argument that only the Commissioner of Insurance could determine whether an 
entity was exempt from licensure. Id. at *13. 
152 See, for example, Comment, Communists and the Right to Bail, 20 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 330, 342 (1952–1953), for a discussion of a series of cases in 
which federal courts rejected bail posted for communist defendants by the Civil 
Rights Congress and proposing that although the Second Circuit rejected the bail 
because the bail fund’s trustees had indicated a disregard for their duties as 
sureties, “[t]he court might have argued that bail funds donated to the surety by 
other persons without consideration provide no incentive to produce the 
accused, since the surety bears no risk of loss.” See also United States v. Flynn, 
190 F.2d 672, 673 (2d Cir. 1951) (per curiam) (discussing grounds for rejecting 
bail posted by the Bail Fund of the Civil Rights Congress of New York). 
153 See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Essay, Kennedy, King, 
Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events Leading to the Introduction of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 657, 660 (1995) (explaining that 
volunteers for demonstrations and sit-ins in Birmingham had been promised 
“that they would have to spend only a few days in jail before being bailed out[,]” 
but that the Alabama legislature manipulated statutory bail limits to deplete the 
fund). 
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Detention.154 In Ann Arbor, Michigan, in the 1970s, a Quaker 
organization’s bail fund aimed more broadly to “impact . . . the 
criminal justice system itself by laying the groundwork for social 
change [to] create a more just and equitable system . . . .”155 Under 
New York’s expansive definition, some such efforts could 
constitute “bail bond businesses,” giving courts statutory grounds 
to reject the bail. Since the definition only applies to people or 
entities that have posted bail in “more than two cases not arising 
out of the same transaction,”156 it could exclude certain funds with 
a political bent, where money is used to bail out a group of 
demonstrators.157 The Bronx court’s view of the matter put the 
Bronx Freedom Fund, a nonprofit corporation created to regularly 
bail out indigent defendants,158 in a somewhat unique situation: 
although a charity, it fit the insurance law’s definition of “bail 
bond business.”159 The definition does leave open the option of 
posting bail no more than twice within a thirty day period in order 
to stay outside the reaches of the licensing requirement.160 
This begs the question of whether it would be possible for a 
revolving bail fund to be licensed so that it would not have to work 
in such a limited manner. New York law specifies that the 
Insurance Department’s superintendent has the power to authorize 
a fidelity and insurance company to conduct a bail bond business, 
but that individuals shall not be licensed to engage in such a 
business.161 Any agents of a licensed entity must be named as 
sublicensees.162 This means that, in addition to passing a written 
                                                          
154 Siobhan Brooks, Symposium, Economic Justice for Sex Workers: 
Interview, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 181, 182 (1999). 
155 See MAUER, supra note 51, at 2–3. 
156 N.Y. INS. LAW § 6801(a)(1) (McKinney 2009) (emphasis added). 
157 See source cited supra note 153 and accompanying text (noting 
usefulness of bail funds to the civil rights movement). 
158 See supra note 149 (regarding the Freedom Fund’s certificate of 
incorporation). 
159 See INS. § 6801(a)(1) (defining “bail bond business”). 
160 See id. 
161 Id. § 6801(b)(2). 
162 Id. § 6802(d). Sublicensees are authorized at the superintendent’s 
discretion. Id. § 6802(c). It is a misdemeanor for any person or entity to solicit, 
negotiate, or effect a deposit or bail bond for an insurer engaged in a bail bond 
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test “appropriate to the doing of a bail bond business,”163 and 
satisfying requirements of “trustworthiness and competence”164 
and “good character and reputation,”165 a bail fund could 
theoretically contract with an agent of a licensed fidelity and 
insurance company in order to run a bail bond business.166 This is 
what the Vera Institute’s bail bond agencies had to do in order to 
post bond.167 However, even for the Vera Institute of Justice, 
which received government funding168 and whose influence 
sparked a national reform movement,169 getting licensed was a 
challenge.170 It was not easy for Vera to find a company willing to 
work with them,171 and once it had, the company charged a fee for 
every bond posted.172 But the premiums charged on each bond pale 
                                                          
business without being licensed. Id. § 6802(a). 
163 Id. § 6802(h). In a city with a population exceeding one hundred 
seventy-five thousand, the examination may cover “the pertinent provisions of 
the criminal procedure law and the pertinent rules and practices of the courts and 
district attorneys’ offices within the area of the applicant’s proposed 
operations.” Id. For additional requirements of licensees in such cities, see id. 
§ 6803(a). 
164 Id. § 6802(e) (“Before the issuance of a license every applicant shall 
satisfy the superintendent as to his trustworthiness and competence . . . .”). 
165 Id. § 6802(g) (“Every applicant . . . shall file . . . written evidence by 
those who know his character and reputation and by such other proof as the 
superintendent may require, including his fingerprints, that he is a person of 
good character and reputation and has never been convicted of any offense 
involving moral turpitude or of any crime.”). 
166 For insurance companies that have agents licensed in New York, see 
Bail Bonds Active Agent Listing, supra note 8. 
167 In order to become licensed, Vera’s bail bond agencies worked with 
Bail USA, Inc., then managing agents for American Bankers Insurance 
Company. E-mail from Susan Rai, Special Counsel, The Vera Inst. of Justice, to 
author (Oct. 22, 2009, 11:05 EST) (on file with author). 
168 The copyright page of Vera’s 1995 report on its bail bond supervision 
programs notes that the project received partial funding from both New York 
City and New York State. See VERA 1995, supra note 101. 
169 See supra discussion accompanying notes 75–84 (discussing the 
Manhattan Bail Project and creation of the CJA). 
170 Telephone Interview with Susan Rai, Special Counsel, The Vera Inst. of 
Justice (Oct. 22, 2009). 
171 Id. 
172 VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 28 (listing a fee of one and one half 
percent on each bond posted). 
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in comparison to the other expenses that such an arrangement 
could cost. Aside from the fees associated with the licensing 
process,173 licensing would require compliance with the demands 
and expectations of the insurance company.174 Vera’s licensed 
projects were heavily staffed175 and funded,176 in part to meet those 
demands, and also to implement one of “the most intensive 
community supervision programs ever attempted.”177 As expensive 
as Vera’s projects were, today they could be even more so. 
Effective 2001, New York amended article 7 of the general 
business law to regulate “bail enforcement agents,”178 defined to 
include persons or entities “engage[ed] in the business of enforcing 
the terms and conditions of a person’s release from custody . . . 
including locating, apprehending and returning any such 
person,”179 which Vera’s agencies certainly were.180 In view of the 
                                                          
173 Section 6802 of the Insurance Law provides for a yearly licensing fee of 
twenty-five dollars for each applicant and each “proposed sublicensee” of such 
applicant, N.Y. INS. LAW § 6802(f) (McKinney 2009), the administrative costs 
of the required written examination, id. § 6802(i), and the filing of a “qualifying 
bond” of five thousand dollars with the superintendant to insure against injury or 
loss resulting from misconduct of the bail bond business. Id. § 6802(j). 
174 For instance, Bail USA, Inc., agent of Seneca Insurance Company, Inc., 
provides on its website that in order for an agent application to be processed, 
contract collateral must first be filed with their office. Licensing Regulations and 
Requirements, BAIL USA, http://www.bailusa.net/learningCenter/sr_licensing 
Regulations.php (follow “Collateral Guidelines” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 28, 
2010). The form provides for minimum cash collateral of $25,000 or $50,000 
property collateral, but notes that “[e]ach applicant is reviewed on an individual 
basis.” Id. The fund would also have to comply with New York’s reporting 
requirements. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 28.2 (2009). 
175 Projects were usually staffed by a “director, an administrative assistant, 
an intake coordinator, a jail screener, a support services coordinator, a 
transitional counselor, and four release monitors. Two enforcement coordinators 
oversaw community supervision in the three sites.” VERA 1995, supra note 101, 
at 13. 
176 See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing the cost of 
Vera’s program). 
177 VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 23. 
178 See 2000 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 562 (A. 1432-B) (McKinney). 
179 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 71 (1-a) (McKinney 2004). See also id. § 71 (4). 
180 See supra text accompanying note 104 (describing importance of bail 
enforcement for Vera’s projects). The new requirements include posting of a 
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various financial burdens that stem from the requirements of the 
insurance law, a bail fund is unlikely to have the financial means 
or the powers of persuasion to contract with an entity engaged in 
this for-profit industry. The important question from a policy 
standpoint is whether the state should require licensing of a 
nonprofit bail fund or whether the activities of such a fund should 
be subject only to the judicial oversight that would apply if the 
fund posted bail too infrequently to qualify as a “bail bond 
business” under New York’s law. 
The Vera Institute of Justice saw licensing as essential to its 
bail bond agencies.181 In Vera’s view, the threat that project staff 
might exercise their power under the bond agreement to arrest 
participants and return them to the Department of Corrections 
“helped the projects control individuals in structured and logical 
ways.”182 Moreover, “the financial risk [of forfeiting the bonds] 
focused program staff on the need for the principal’s strict 
compliance.”183 A bail fund operates with that same element of 
financial risk; if a defendant fails to appear in court, bail is 
forfeited, the fund is not replenished and the project cannot be 
sustained over time.184 That threat provides an incentive for the 
fund to carefully select its clients. For Vera, the monitoring powers 
of the licensed bondsperson were essential because the agencies 
were purposefully choosing to work with higher risk defendants.185  
For commercial bonds businesses the monitoring powers are 
essential because the bondsperson’s profit motive leads him or her 
to select clients with higher bail, which often corresponds to higher 
                                                          
$500,000 bond as a prerequisite to licensing. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 74 (1)(b) 
(McKinney 2010). 
181 VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 24 (“Vera’s planners, project directors, 
and enforcement officers agree[d] that this power [was] essential to preventing 
additional crime and ensuring that defendants [did] not evade court 
proceedings.”). 
182 Id. at 5 (observing additionally that participants “were not a naturally 
compliant population”).  
183 Id. at 24. 
184 See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing revolving nature 
of the Freedom Fund).  
185 See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text (describing Vera’s 
selection process and the rationale behind it). 
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flight risk.186 But bondspersons do not solely rely on their powers 
of arrest; rather, they employ a variety of ways to minimize the 
risk of flight.187 Such practices include maintaining contact with 
clients by phone, mail, and personal visits, as well as requiring 
third parties (usually close to the defendant) to co-sign and put up 
collateral for the defendant’s release.188 Especially for less serious 
offenses, a missed court appearance is often simply a matter of 
forgetfulness.189 Given the Freedom Fund’s reported success 
rates,190 the project suggests that if a bail fund is motivated to 
select lower-risk defendants, it can function successfully without 
holding the threat of arrest over participants’ heads.191 The fact that 
                                                          
186 See Thomas H. Cohen, Commercial Surety Bail and the Problem of 
Missed Court Appearances and Pretrial Detention 373 (3rd Annual Conference 
on Empirical Legal Studies Papers, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1130964## (“Higher bond amounts translate 
into more profits for surety agents, meaning that the profit potential, rather than 
flight risk, could be the primary driver behind who surety agents accept.”). This 
is not to say that commercial bondspersons do not directly consider flight risk 
when making their determination. “The power of surety agents to use their 
absolute discretion in selecting which defendants to release should not be 
understated.” Id. at 345–46. Queens bail bondsman, John Medina, described this 
assessment as determining whether a defendant “pre-qualified” for release. 
Interview with John Medina, supra note 1. Thomas H. Cohen, of the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, engaged in preliminary research asking “whether monitoring 
practices or selection effects account for the efficacy of [commercial] surety 
bond.” Cohen, supra, at 333. He posited that “if selection effects explain the 
lower missed court appearance rate, the implications are that the commercial 
bond industry does no better at preventing missed court appearances compared 
to other forms of pretrial release.” Id. at 336. Using data from the U.S. 
Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics’ State Court Processing 
Statistics, id. at 351, the study’s methodology involved comparing flight risk 
characteristics of felony defendants in counties where surety bond agents are 
heavily utilized with counties where they play little or no role. Id. at 336–37. 
Cohen determined that “SCPS data cannot be used to definitively establish 
whether surety agents are selectively choosing the best defendants or using 
various pretrial monitoring or retrieval techniques to ensure court appearances . . 
. .” Id. at 381. 
187 Cohen, supra note 186, at 347–48. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 348; Interview with John Medina, supra note 1. 
190 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
191 Cf. supra text accompanying note 104 (noting the significance of the 
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bail funds have been known to receive county funding192 indicates 
that at least some legislators also believe they can work 
successfully.  
Of course, licensing is about more than having the power to 
surrender a defendant back to authorities. In Miranda, the Bronx 
court raised a number of concerns that went beyond licensing, 
some of which were distinct to the Bronx Freedom Fund.193 The 
following portion of this Note assesses the court’s concerns and 
determines that some of the aspects of the Freedom Fund that the 
court viewed as contrary to good policy are actually among the 
reasons why the Bronx Freedom Fund’s model can be effective. 
One of the court’s concerns was the fact that the Freedom Fund 
was established and run with donated funds.194 The project was 
initially funded by grant195 and subsequently began accepting 
donations from the general public.196 There are a number of 
advantages to a bail fund that operates off of donations. For one, 
this strategy helps to conserve space in jails without using taxpayer 
dollars, a point the bail bond industry often touts for itself.197 
Additionally, dependence on donors may serve to give such a bail 
fund a heightened sense of responsibility. If the project fails to 
operate well, funds would be depleted, donors would be scarce and 
reputations could suffer as a consequence. In contrast, when a bail 
fund receives legislative funding, that funding may be tied as 
closely to fiscal health as it is to the fund’s performance.198 And 
                                                          
power of arrest to Vera’s projects). 
192 See supra note 145 and accompanying text (noting that other New York 
bail funds have received public funds). 
193 See generally People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 WL 2170254 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County June 22, 2009). 
194 Id. at *15. 
195 Steinberg & Towns, supra note 127, at 21. 
196 See BRONX FREEDOM FUND, http://www.bronxfreedomfund.org (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2010) (allowing visitors to donate by credit card); see also 
Katha Pollitt, ‘Tis the Season to Be Generous, THE NATION, Jan. 5, 2009, 
available at http://www.thenation.com/article/tis-season-be-generous (listing the 
Freedom Fund as one of ten suggestions for year-end donations). 
197 See supra text accompanying notes 42–43 (concerning the claim that 
commercial bonding saves taxpayer funds). 
198 See John Mariani, Stanczyk Wants Mahoney to Restore Onondaga 
County Bail Expeditor, THE POST-STANDARD (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www. 
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regardless of the fund’s success rate, if legislators believe that the 
fund has become unpopular in the eyes of their constituents, the 
project could come to an abrupt halt.199  
In addition, the Miranda court was troubled that the initial 
grant money had since been mixed with donations from unknown 
individuals.200 The court reasoned that although charities generally 
need not have a screening mechanism to determine the source of 
donations, the fact that the money would be used to post bail put a 
“special responsibility” on the parties seeking donations.201 The 
legal grounds for examining the source of money or property 
deposited as bail stems from section 520.30(1) of the New York 
State Criminal Procedure Law.202 The Miranda court cited People 
                                                          
syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2009/02/stanczyk_wants_mahoney_to_rest.html.  
The [Onondaga County] Bail Expeditor Program was among more than 
two dozen contracts with human service providers that [County 
Executive Joanie] Mahoney canceled last month as part of her effort to 
close a $10.7 million budget gap . . . . The county provided the lion’s 
share of the program’s budget, which included $108,000 to pay two 
full-time and one part-time staff members and to maintain a $15,000 
revolving bail fund. From that pool, the program posted half of the the 
[sic] bail set for poor defendants accused—not convicted—of non-
violent misdemeanors. The program got the money bail back if the 
defendant showed up for court. 
Id. 
199 This is not to say that a bail fund receiving legislative funding would not 
be motivated to perform well for fear of losing those funds. Rather, a taxpayer-
funded project might lose funding on political whim, regardless of its success 
rate. 
200 People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 WL 2170254, at *7 n.8 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County June 22, 2009). 
201 Id. 
202 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.30 (1) (McKinney 2009). 
The court may inquire into any matter stated or required to be stated in 
the justifying affidavits, and may also inquire into other matters 
appropriate to the determination, which include but are not limited to . . 
. (a) [t]he background, character and reputation of any obligor, and, in 
the case of an insurance company bail bond, the qualifications of the 
surety-obligor and its executing agent; and (b) [t]he source of any 
money or property deposited by any obligor as security, and whether 
any such money or property constitutes the fruits of criminal or 
unlawful conduct; and (c) [t]he source of any money or property 
delivered or agreed to be delivered to any obligor as indemnification on 
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v. Agnello203 as support for its reasoning that “[p]ublic policy 
dictates that the source of all money intended to be used to post 
bail be ascertainable.”204 However, in interpreting section 520.30, 
both People v. Agnello and People v. Esquivel,205 the case whose 
rational Agnello follows, concluded that when an obligor, such as a 
bonding company, is indemnified by a third party, it is the 
indemnitor who bears much of the risk of the defendant’s flight.206 
Accordingly, the court must be allowed to consider the relationship 
between the defendant and the indemnitor and to determine the 
indemnitor’s motive for assuming the risk of forfeiture. If, for 
example, the indemnitor shares no special relationship with the 
defendant, but instead had been coerced into assuming this risk, the 
arrangement would hardly deter the defendant’s flight.207 The 
Esquivel court worried that accepting the bond simply because it 
had been posted by a licensed company would make it easier for 
defendants to bribe or coerce third parties to post collateral.208  
                                                          
the bond, and whether any such money or property constitutes the fruits 
of criminal or unlawful conduct; and (d) [t]he background, character 
and reputation of any person who has indemnified or agreed to 
indemnify an obligor upon the bond; and whether any such indemnitor, 
not being licensed by the superintendent of insurance in accordance 
with the insurance law, has within a period of one month prior to such 
indemnity transaction given indemnification or security for like 
purpose in more than two cases not arising out of the same transaction; 
and (e) [t]he source of any money posted as cash bail, and whether any 
such money constitutes the fruits of criminal or unlawful conduct; and 
(f) [t]he background, character and reputation of the person posting 
cash bail. 
Id. 
203 People v. Agnello, 705 N.Y.S.2d 525, 528 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 
2000). 
204 Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *7 n.8.   
205 People v. Esquivel, 601 N.Y.S.2d 541, 547 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 
1993). 
206 Agnello, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 528. 
207 See id. 
208 Esquivel, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 541. In Esquivel, the indemnitors had pledged 
their home as collateral for a defendant whom they barely knew. Id. at 542–43. 
For an argument that the defendant should not bear the burden of proof in bail 
sufficiency hearings, see generally John C. Longmire, CPL § 520.30: New York 
Supreme Court Holds that Defendant Has the Burden of Proving that Collateral 
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That concern—that a defendant could raise bail money by 
illegal activity or threaten a third party to post collateral while 
avoiding a bail source inquiry—209is sharply mitigated, if it exists 
at all, as long as the fund makes an independent assessment of each 
defendant when determining whether to post bail.210 Defendants 
would have no means to ensure that they would in any way benefit 
from a donation that they had obtained through coercion or other 
illegal activities. This means that the identity of the fund’s 
contributors is not material to whether a defendant will be more or 
less likely to flee. Rather, since a bail fund assumes the risk of 
forfeiture directly, the court need only look to the relationship 
between the fund and the defendant to make an informed decision 
as to whether to accept the bail. A bail fund that solicits 
anonymous donations does not pose the same concerns that were 
present in Esquivel and Agnello. The rationale in those cases does 
not support scrutinizing general donations that are not targeted 
toward any particular defendant. Instead, those two decisions stand 
more for the proposition that the sole fact of licensure cannot 
legitimize bail money; the judiciary must be free to scrutinize the 
relationship between the defendant and the person or entity 
assuming the financial risk when examining the sufficiency of the 
bail. 
The more fundamental question that arises when bail money is 
provided by anonymous donors is whether the accused will feel 
motivated to appear in court when friends or family do not have to 
forfeit money or property because of his or her failure to appear. In 
other words, it is important to consider other incentives that may 
exist when someone close to the defendant is not putting money or 
property on the line. Vera’s bail bond supervision projects 
confirmed that the increased possibility of receiving probation 
from a judge could provide a powerful incentive for defendants to 
comply with the conditions of release.211 Avoiding time served in 
                                                          
Posted to Indemnify a Bail Bond Obligor Is Not the Fruit of Criminal or 
Unlawful Activity, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 297 (1994). 
209 Esquivel, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 547. 
210 See People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 WL 2170254, at *8 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County June 22, 2009) (noting that the Bronx Freedom 
Fund made such an independent assessment). 
211 VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 2. 
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jail was a shared goal for both the projects and the accused.212 A 
bail fund and its beneficiaries also share that goal.213 In addition to 
the hope of a lighter sentence, the threat of a bail jumping 
charge,214 or even a simple reminder of a court date, can motivate a 
defendant to appear in court.215 But for more serious offenses or 
more troubled clients, a simple reminder may not suffice. For 
Vera’s Bronx agency, which maintained a high degree of 
supervision over defendants, sustaining contact with participants 
was not enough to ensure compliance.216 It is in this regard that the 
particulars of the Bronx Freedom Fund become important to 
whether its basic model can fare well in the Bronx, where Vera’s 
agency, by its own accounts, failed.  
Vera’s project faced severe challenges in the Bronx.217 Even at 
the intake stage, because of the vast and bureaucratic nature of the 
New York City system, the Bronx agency had difficulty 
identifying and making contact with defendants.218 By contrast, the 
Bronx Freedom Fund’s connection to one defense organization 
enabled it to identify suitable clients with much greater ease.219 
Vera’s agency faced even greater challenges once it had bailed 
                                                          
212 Id. 
213 See Read More, BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra note 69 (discussing aim 
of avoiding jail sentences).  
214 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 215.55–57 (McKinney 2010). 
215 See supra text accompanying note 189 (stating that, particularly for less 
serious offenses, missed court dates are often the result of forgetfulness); see 
also Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *9 (noting that the Freedom Fund’s project 
director would remain in contact with clients, reminding them of scheduled 
appearances throughout the release period). 
216 See supra text accompanying notes 124–25 (explaining that Vera’s 
Bronx agency had to be discontinued). 
217 See VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 19. 
218 Id. 
219 See Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *8 (explaining that a Bronx 
Defenders attorney would contact the Freedom Fund’s project director with 
information about a defendant to whom the attorney had been assigned as 
counsel and, based upon that information as well as information from the CJA 
report included in the client’s court file, the director would determine whether 
the Freedom Fund should post bail in that case); see also supra notes 84–86 and 
accompanying text (detailing information included in a defendant’s CJA report). 
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each defendant out of jail.220 The area surrounding Vera’s project 
office was distressed and it was difficult to engage participants in 
programs or productive activities.221 The agency was unable to find 
space for participants in local residential drug treatment centers 
and even outpatient services were insufficient.222 Vera’s report 
states that some felt that the agency “was detached from the 
borough’s social service community and that inexperienced staff 
did not know where and how to access services other than 
outpatient drug treatment.”223 These deficiencies highlight one of 
the more important differences between Vera’s Bronx agency and 
the Bronx Freedom Fund. By working with only Bronx Defenders’ 
clients, the Freedom Fund benefited from the roots that 
organization has put down in the Bronx community and the social 
service net that it already has in place.224 Additional support for 
this proposition lies in Vera’s reasoning as to why its Nassau and 
Essex agencies performed well. The Nassau agency benefited from 
using one provider for drug treatment; this allowed the staff from 
Vera’s agency and the drug treatment provider to become familiar 
with each other, and with each other’s rules and procedure.225 
Working with many different providers, however, led to 
instability.226 In Essex, in-house services provided an effective 
means of supervising and controlling project participants.227 
Similarly, the strong support system that the Bronx Defenders 
provides to its clients228 is really what helped the bail fund project 
                                                          
220 See VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 20. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 See Community Connections, BRONX DEFENDERS, http://www.bronx 
defenders.org/our-work/community-connections (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
225 VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 25. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 22. 
228 See Holistic Defense, BRONX DEFENDERS, http://www.bronxdefenders. 
org/our-work/holistic-defense (last visited Sept. 15, 2010) (“Located in the heart 
of the South Bronx, our office has been engaged in a constant dialogue with the 
community we serve . . . . As holistic defenders we are committed to providing 
our clients with seamless access to services to meet [their legal and social 
support] needs.”); Read More, BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra note 69 (“We 
connect our clients with services and support for the duration of their cases, 
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to get off the ground.229 
The Miranda decision focuses on problems that the Bronx 
court found in the relationship between a bail fund and a defenders 
office.230 In distinguishing the Freedom Fund from other New 
York bail funds, the court noted that “[e]very indigent member of 
the communities served by [those] . . . organizations has an 
opportunity to apply for the bail money.”231 Without discussing the 
point in detail, the court went on to state that the Freedom Fund 
“operates according to a [prohibited] ‘pre-arrest’ agreement-its 
own certificate of incorporation indicates that it has agreed to post 
bail exclusively for future clients of the Bronx Defenders.”232 But 
given that it is the court system that assigns indigent defendants 
from the community to the Bronx Defenders, and that the Freedom 
Fund would then make an independent determination whether to 
post bail in a given case, 233 it is difficult to imagine that regulators 
could have had this kind of arrangement in mind when they 
defined and prohibited “pre-arrest agreements” in order to “prevent 
the use of the bail bond business in the furtherance of organized 
crime.”234  
The opinion does touch on an aspect of the relationship that 
raises a more fundamental question. Although the court did not 
                                                          
ensuring that they not only meet their court obligations but also get assistance to 
stabilize their lives in the long term.”). 
229 The Freedom Fund’s connection with the Bronx Defenders is also what 
drew initial donors in the first place. Telephone Interview with Robin G. 
Steinberg, Executive Dir., The Bronx Defenders & Zoë Towns, Project Dir., The 
Bronx Freedom Fund (Sept. 26, 2009).  
230 People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 WL 2170254, at *1, *10–
19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County June 22, 2009). 
231 Id. at *10. 
232 Id. at *12. New York regulation provides that no licensed bail bond 
agent “shall enter into any agreement with any party, the purpose of which is to 
provide, on a continuing basis, for the furnishing of any bail bond, or other 
security in lieu of bond, on behalf of any person other than the aforesaid party 
who may be arrested on criminal charges.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 
11, § 28.1(a) (2009). Automobile clubs or insurers are explicitly exempted. Id. 
§ 28.1(c).  
233 See Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *8 (describing the process through 
which the Freedom Fund decides whether to post bail). 
234 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, §§ 28.0–28.1 (2009). 
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rule on the issue, citing a lack of clear legal precedent,235 the 
District Attorney’s office suggested that the involvement of 
defense attorneys with the bail fund might present a possible 
ethical violation.236 An article cited in the Miranda opinion,237 
Take the Money or Run: The Risky Business of Acting as Both Your 
Client’s Lawyer and Bail Bondsman, discusses this issue in 
detail.238 After surveying statutes and ethics opinions across the 
nation, the authors determined that it is the “prevailing view” that 
an attorney should not act as bondsperson for his or her client.239 
However, this view rests almost entirely on the financial 
relationship that exists when an attorney posts his or her own funds 
as bail for a client, and the risk that the attorney’s personal 
financial interests will conflict with his or her ability to act in the 
client’s interests.240 The Freedom Fund avoided that conflict 
because the Bronx Defenders attorneys would take on no personal 
financial risk when donated funds were used to post bail for their 
clients.241 Moreover, Rule 1.8(e) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct,242 which provides that “a lawyer shall not advance or 
guarantee financial assistance to the client,” goes on to carve out 
                                                          
235 Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *19. 
236 Id. at *16. 
237 Id. at *18 n.25. 
238 See generally Dayla S. Pepi & Donna D. Bloom, Article, Take the 
Money or Run: The Risky Business of Acting as Both Your Client’s Lawyer and 
Bail Bondsman, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 933 (2006). 
239 Id. at 948.  
240 See id. at 976–77 (“[T]he practice of acting as bail bondsman for a 
criminal defendant client raises ethical concerns in four areas: (1) conflict with 
the client involving the lawyer’s own potentially adverse pecuniary interest; 
(2) protection of client confidentiality; (3) improper solicitation of clients; and 
(4) financial relationships between a lawyer and his client.”). New York’s 
legislature has made it clear that it disapproves of lawyers having a financial 
interest in bail, providing that “[a]ny member of the bar having any financial 
interest by which he is to profit from the giving of bail shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor.” N.Y. INS. LAW § 6804(c) (McKinney 2009) (emphasis added). 
See also N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 647 (1993), available 
at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics_Opinions&CONTE
NTID=5427&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm. 
241 See Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *3 (indicating that funding is 
derived from charitable donations). 
242 Id. at *16. 
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an exception for “a lawyer representing an indigent or pro bono 
client [who] may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on 
behalf of the client.”243 American Bar Association Formal Ethics 
Opinion 04-432, addresses that rule directly, stating that posting a 
client’s bail can be considered among “court costs and expenses of 
litigation.”244  
A more serious question is whether, when there is a connection 
between a defense organization and a bail fund, the client might 
see the two organizations as one and the same.245 Clients will 
understand that the fund risked money to bail them out of jail and 
might not want to forfeit those funds.246 In Take the Money or Run, 
the authors posed the problem this way:  
If the client screens . . . information because of worries 
about what the attorney may choose to disclose to the court, 
she may censor relevant information . . . . Given the 
necessity for complete candor . . . any confusion about the 
attorney’s role influencing the client to withhold 
information is a serious risk . . . .247 
But a client’s recognition that her defense organization played 
a role in helping her to attain pretrial release, at no cost to herself, 
is far more likely to foster a stronger attorney-client relationship. 
Additionally, clients who are not incarcerated pretrial can contact 
their attorneys with ease, do not have to meet with counsel in the 
confines of a detention center, and can appear in court after having 
                                                          
243 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 (2009) (Rule 1.8(e)). 
244 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 
(2004). The opinion begins, “[a] lawyer may post, or arrange for the posting of, 
a bond to secure the release from custody of a client whom the lawyer represents 
. . . in those rare circumstances in which there is no significant risk that her 
representation of the client will be materially limited by her personal interest in 
recovering the amount advanced.” Id. “[T]he jurisdictions addressing this issue 
are split.” Pepi & Bloom, supra note 238, at 995. 
245 See Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *4 (showing concern over the 
Freedom Fund’s shared office space). 
246 See id. at *9 (noting that the Freedom Fund’s project director would 
impress upon clients that if they failed to appear, the bail money could not be 
used for future clients). 
247 Pepi & Bloom, supra note 238, at 984. 
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slept, bathed, and dressed outside of a detention facility.248 In 
reality, there is less reason to wonder whether a bail fund can 
fulfill its responsibilities to its clients than to ask whether the fund 
is capable of meeting its obligations to the court. 
As the Miranda opinion notes, a person who bails an individual 
out of jail enters into a contract with the court.249 Upon posting 
cash bail, that person signs an undertaking that states in part: “I 
undertake that the defendant will appear in this action whenever 
required . . . and I acknowledge that the bail will be forfeited if the 
defendant does not comply with any requirement or order of 
process to appear in this action.”250 One of the concerns underlying 
most of the Bronx court’s discussion is the view that the Freedom 
Fund had not taken proper steps to fulfill that responsibility.251 The 
court noted that the Freedom Fund’s board had authorized the 
project director to use her independent discretion to bail clients out 
of jail when accused of violent felonies,252 and that the Freedom 
Fund’s method of determining whether or not to bail out a client 
was, as compared to the factors a court considers pursuant to 
section 510.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law, not a full “flight 
risk” assessment.253 In response to these concerns, one might argue 
                                                          
248 See BRONX FREEDOM FUND, http://www.bronxfreedomfund.org (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2010) (observing that the Freedom Fund enables clients to 
“fight their cases from a position of strength and freedom”). 
249 Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *11. 
250 Id. at *2. 
251 See id. at *8–9, *10. 
252 Id. at *6. But see Thomas Adcock, Pilot Program Provides Bail Money 
for Indigent, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 7, 2007, at 24, col. 2 (describing the clients who 
would benefit as those who had been “arrested for non-violent offenses and 
whose Criminal Justice Agency pretrial evaluation shows little risk of flight”). 
253 Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *8 n.10. The original written criteria 
that the Freedom Fund used to determine whether to post bail were developed 
by the Freedom Fund’s founders and project director and attorneys from both 
inside and outside the Bronx Defenders. Id. at *4. The final criteria were 
ultimately approved by the Freedom Fund’s Board of Directors. Id. Those 
criteria included four factors: “the person must be a ‘client of the Bronx 
Defenders;’ the client’s ‘bail is $1500 or below;’ the ‘top charge is misdemeanor 
or non-violent felony;’ and the ‘CJA score or adjusted/corrected CJA score [is] 3 
or above.’” Id. (alteration in original). The Freedom Fund did not view a 
defendant’s criminal history as relevant to whether they would appear in court. 
Id. at *8 n.10. 
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that since the court set bail in the first place by conducting its own 
flight risk assessment, we should rely only on the surety’s 
willingness to take on the financial risk for assurance that the 
defendant will appear.254 But that view has been rejected in other 
cases, which have held that a court acts within its discretion if it 
finds that a lack of relationship between a principal and surety is 
reason to disapprove cash bail.255 More importantly, in the absence 
of legislative funding and licensing, neither of which is ideal for a 
bail fund because of the drawbacks each presents,256 it is judicial 
oversight that can lend legitimacy to the bail fund’s operations.257 
If we accept that the judiciary should examine a bail fund’s 
reasoning or motives in posting bail, what then is it that should 
guide the court’s inquiry?  
The judiciary does not expect commercial bail bond agents to 
conduct a full flight risk assessment.258 Rather, judges recognize 
that “[t]he surety is a business enterprise [whose] primary concern 
is to be indemnified if the bail is forfeited.”259 Accordingly, judges 
adjust the monetary value of the bond to account for both the risk 
that a defendant will abscond and the financial resources available 
to the defendant.260 Whether or not a system of financial release is 
the most effective method, it is the basis upon which judges make 
the bail determination; therefore, if a bail fund does not require the 
defendant to incur the financial risk the judge believes he or she 
will incur, that bail fund may undermine the judicial decision. 
Judge Lasker, in the Southern District Court of New York, once 
                                                          
254 See infra text accompanying notes 258–59 (indicating that to a certain 
extent the judiciary will not examine the business decisions of a commercial 
surety). 
255 People v. Baker, 729 N.Y.S.2d 580, 585 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2001). 
256 See supra text accompanying notes 170–80, 198–99 (discussing such 
drawbacks). 
257 The fact that the legislature has captured within the definition of “bail 
bond business” any person or entity posting bail more than two times in one 
month, supports that this idea of “legitimacy” is important. See supra text 
accompanying notes 136–40. 
258 See People v. McIntyre, 640 N.Y.S.2d 386, 390 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 
1996). 
259 Id. 
260 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (McKinney 2009). 
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noted this concern:  
[T]he establishment of a bail fund might well undermine 
the bail decisions made by state court judges. When judges 
set bail, they are obligated to do so on the basis of the 
resources available to the defendant or his sureties. If 
judges are not aware of the existence of a bail fund, they 
may be setting bail based on inaccurate assumptions about 
the resources available to the defendant. If they are aware 
of such a fund, they are left uncertain as to whether their 
bail rulings will be effective.261 
Judges have been instructed to consider certain statutorily 
mandated factors, including the defendant’s financial resources, in 
making their release decisions.262 If judges—figures central to the 
pretrial process—263feel that their decisions are being undermined, 
one risk is that release and bail decisions may become more 
inconsistent, arbitrary, and inequitable.264 But as long as judges are 
fully informed of the existence and nature of any bail fund, 
including the criteria the fund employs in its bail determination, 
the judiciary is still positioned to fulfill its own responsibilities 
with regard to bail and the conditions of pretrial release. The bail 
fund, as surety, can be expected to provide the court with that 
information when requested or risk the court rejecting the bail. 
Judicial oversight can provide a more flexible and nuanced means 
of “legitimizing” an active bail fund than licensing or legislative 
funding would permit. That kind of oversight could allow more 
advocates the opportunity to craft solutions to what has been an 
enduring problem. 
From the perspective of an advocate, adjusting internal 
decision making in order to appeal to more members of the 
judiciary is not without its disadvantages. Vera’s bail bond 
agencies illustrate this point. The agencies were a collaborative 
                                                          
261 Benjamin v. Sielaff, No. 75 Civ. 3073 (MEL), 1990 WL 212911, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1990). 
262 CRIM. PROC. § 510.30. 
263 See Judicial Responsibility, supra note 93, at 29.  
264 See supra text accompanying note 93; see also supra notes 77–82 and 
accompanying text (explaining that one goal of bail reform was to enable judges 
to base their release decisions on objective criteria in order to reduce inequities). 
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effort, operating with direct involvement from the courts and the 
city and state.265 That involvement did pose some problems for 
Vera. For one, there was a focus on conserving jail space,266 which 
would likely be unimportant to an organization that was not 
receiving public funds. Given the evidence that lengthier periods of 
pretrial supervision led to more difficulties in controlling 
participants,267 that emphasis might have been misguided. Judicial 
oversight sometimes presented other difficulties for Vera. Because 
the projects were accountable to judges for the degree of 
supervision exercised, Vera’s staff members were unable to use 
their discretion to ease pressure on a defendant without judicial 
approval, which in the Bronx was rarely given.268 That effect of 
judicial control is probably frustrating for advocates who see the 
general pattern of judicial decisions as flawed.269 But in order for 
the judiciary to be the body overseeing a bail fund’s operations, the 
fund’s internal decision making must be subject to judicial review. 
When an entity posting bail has some sort of legislative sanction, 
through either funding or licensing, the court is likely to show 
more deference in approving the bail. In contrast, where a fund has 
not received such sanction, the court may be concerned if the fund 
is not taking into consideration the factors that the legislature has 
deemed important to the bail determination. In order for the 
judiciary to have confidence in a bail fund, which necessarily 
exercises much less control over its clients than a program like 
Vera’s, the criteria the fund uses to select defendants takes on more 
importance. Hence the Bronx court’s concern that the Freedom 
                                                          
265 See VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 10, 18. When the Nassau Agency 
opened “[t]he project received enthusiastic support from the Chief Judge of New 
York State, the Nassau County Chief Administrative Judge, and the county 
sheriff. Long-standing charitable organizations rallied the cooperation of county 
support-service organizations.” Id. at 18. Judges were given progress reports on 
defendants’ performance. Id. at 10. 
266 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (explaining Vera’s rationale 
in choosing defendants who would likely be incarcerated for longer periods in 
order to conserve jail space). 
267 See supra text accompanying note 115 (noting that drawn out periods of 
supervision strained participants’ commitment to the program). 
268 See VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 21 n.18. 
269 See, e.g., supra note 87 and accompanying text (noting CJA’s 
frustration that many judges did not utilize the release recommendation). 
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Fund was not performing a full flight risk assessment.270 
This concern is perhaps increased where the bail fund is 
connected to a defense organization. The Bronx Defenders’ 
solution to this foreseeable problem seems to have been to insulate 
the decision making process from the defense attorneys.271 But 
considering that the defense attorneys took part in drafting the 
initial criteria for release,272 one might expect that the Freedom 
Fund’s goals and considerations largely mirror that of the defense 
organization, which does nothing to alleviate the court’s concern 
that the Freedom Fund failed to conduct appropriate release 
assessments. A bail fund could directly address the court’s 
complaint that the Freedom Fund seemed to be operating pursuant 
to “secret rules,”273 by, first, having a board lay down more 
concrete criteria, rather than authorizing a director to exercise his 
or her discretion in all cases, and, then, being open about those 
criteria. This is particularly fitting for a fund that accepts donations 
from the public.274 The tactic of the Washtenaw bail fund275 was to 
exclude staff and attorneys from board membership with the belief 
that it would allow the board to operate more objectively.276 After 
receiving relevant information from a staff person, a majority vote 
of the Washtenaw bail fund’s board was required to post bail.277 
Besides being more difficult to implement, laying out more 
concrete criteria or involving members of the community in the 
decision of whether to post bail could frustrate a bail fund’s goals. 
It could delay the release process and it could make certain 
                                                          
270 See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
271 See supra note 219 (describing how attorneys would submit a bail 
request to the Freedom Fund’s director). 
272 People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 WL 2170254, at *4 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Bronx County June 22, 2009). 
273 Id. at *4 n.4 (“Public policy certainly requires . . . that corporations 
posting bail as a business do not do so pursuant to any secret rules or 
agreements.”). 
274 See supra note 196 (noting the Freedom Fund’s practice of accepting 
public donations). 
275 See supra note 51 (referring to the American Friends Service 
Committee’s Washtenaw Community Bail Fund in Ann Arbor, Michigan). 
276 MAUER, supra note 51, at 18. 
277 Id. 
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defendants ineligible for the bail money if such criteria took into 
account one’s criminal history or the charge severity. That harkens 
back to the problem inherent in the current system—that some 
defendants who have been charged with more serious offenses, can 
easily pay for their release while a defendant charged with 
misdemeanor assault may remain in jail pretrial, with less ability to 
mount a defense and more incentive to plead guilty even when 
innocent.278 However, increased board involvement in the actual 
bail determination, more definite guidelines, and more clarity as to 
what those guidelines are, would be achievable means through 
which a bail fund could operate with a higher degree of 
accountability, laying the foundation for more widespread support 
from judges. 
CONCLUSION 
Having successfully posted bail for approximately 130 
defendants before the Miranda court rejected bail posted by the 
Bronx Freedom Fund,279 it is likely that a number of judges in the 
Bronx would disagree that a nonprofit bail fund is cause for any 
concern. But while there is bound to be disagreement over some or 
all of the points made by the court in Miranda, what should not be 
so contentious is that the judge raised these issues and took them 
seriously. As one pretrial researcher put it: 
The bail decision, to release or detain a defendant pending 
trial and the setting of terms and conditions of bail, is a 
monumental task which carries enormous consequences not 
only for the pretrial defendant but also for the safety of the 
community, the integrity of the judicial process, and the 
utilization of our often overtaxed criminal justice resources. 
The bail decision is the responsibility of the Court.280  
                                                          
278 See supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text (describing the burden of 
financial release conditions on the indigent). 
279 See People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 WL 2170254, at *8 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County June 22, 2009). 
280 MARIE VANNOSTRAND, CRIME & JUSTICE INST. & NAT’L INST. OF 
CORRS., LEGAL AND EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES: APPLICATIONS OF LEGAL 
PRINCIPLES, LAWS, AND RESEARCH TO THE FIELD OF PRETRIAL SERVICES 1 
(2007). 
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Indigent defendants are not served by the money bail system.281 
Because such defendants also frequently lack strong community 
ties, bail is set and, without financial assistance or a more 
“appealing” plea bargain, many remain in jail pretrial.282 The cost-
effectiveness and feasibility of the Bronx Freedom Fund’s effort to 
address this problem is in large part attributable to its relationship 
with the Bronx Defenders.283 A relationship with a well-
established defense organization enables a bail fund to give 
meaningful support to released clients without subjecting them to 
extreme levels of supervision that in some cases may be 
counterproductive.284 If advocates taking this approach hope to 
attract a broader base of support or to have their projects replicated 
elsewhere, some of the concerns raised in the Miranda opinion 
remain. While oversight can be accomplished to some degree 
through licensing or by putting public funds toward a bail fund, a 
privately run fund that is subject to judicial oversight has the 
benefit of potentially greater financial security and the advantage 
of more flexibility in making its bail determinations.285 Some 
flexibility is important if we hope to develop innovative ways of 
addressing pretrial injustice. However, in order to win support 
from the judiciary, a bail fund may benefit from laying out criteria 
to be used in their bail determination that takes into account the 
factors that the judiciary must consider by legislative mandate. 
 
                                                          
281 See supra notes 22–30 and accompanying text (describing how the 
indigent are left out of commercial bail practices). 
282 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
283 See supra Part III (describing relationship between the Freedom Fund 
and the Bronx Defenders). 
284 Compare supra notes 101, 105, 110, 114, 268 and accompanying text 
(describing Vera’s strict model), with supra notes 215, 228 and accompanying 
text (noting the Freedom Fund’s more flexible approach). 
285 Cf. supra notes 117, 198–99, 266 and accompanying text (describing the 
drawbacks to public funding, particularly the emphasis on conserving jail 
space). 
